Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah Killed in Israeli Strike, Iran's Response Anticipated

The death of Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah has raised concerns about Iran's potential response, as the proxy group remains crucial to Tehran's regional strategy. The regime faces a dilemma in choosing its next steps, balancing the need to support Hezbollah with domestic pressures and the risk of further conflict.

## **Article:**

Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah Killed in Israeli Strike, Iran's Response Anticipated

Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah Killed in Israeli Strike, Iran's Response Anticipated

The confirmation of Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah's death poses a significant challenge to Iran, which has heavily invested in the proxy group over the past decades. The regime's response will determine the trajectory of its regional strategy and the potential for further escalation.

The relationship between Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Nasrallah was close, akin to that of father and son. However, Nasrallah's recent setbacks, including intelligence failures and the assassinations of senior commanders, had put pressure on Khamenei. Nasrallah's death further complicates this situation.

Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah Killed in Israeli Strike, Iran's Response Anticipated

Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah Killed in Israeli Strike, Iran's Response Anticipated

Iran's leadership cannot afford to remain passive in the face of Hezbollah's humiliation and harm. Inaction would not only weaken their most important proxy but could also signal the unraveling of their regional strategy. Khamenei and his regime are left with three main options to consider:

1. **Logistical and Propaganda Support:**

Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah Killed in Israeli Strike, Iran's Response Anticipated

Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah Killed in Israeli Strike, Iran's Response Anticipated

Iran could provide advisory and propaganda support to Hezbollah, as it did in 2006 during the last direct war between Hezbollah and Israel. The IRGC's Quds Force would assist Hezbollah's militants in command and control, while coordinating proxy attacks from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. However, it is doubtful whether this would alter the mindset of the post-October 7 Israeli government, which has been aggressive against Hezbollah.

2. **Escalation via Proxies:**

Iran could escalate the conflict through its proxies to provoke international pressure on Israel. The IRGC and its proxies would target American, European, and Arab interests in the Middle East to force Israel to back down. Beyond the region, Iran could intensify its terror campaign against the international Jewish community. This approach aims to create enough external pressure to weaken Israel's resolve.

3. **Direct Strikes on Israel:**

This option would likely be favored by the IRGC's radical constituencies, who have criticized Tehran's reluctance to strike Tel Aviv directly. Hezbollah has reportedly urged Iran to intervene directly, but such a move would carry significant risks. The IRGC would need to launch more substantial attacks than the symbolic strikes of April this year, and would face almost certain retaliation from Israel, an outcome Iran seeks to avoid.

The IRGC's doctrine and military infrastructure suggest that a combination of the first two options is most likely. Iran will provide logistical support while destabilizing the region and beyond. However, Khamenei must also consider Iran's domestic crises and economic fragility. Any further weakening of the economy could stoke unrest among Iranians, potentially leading to additional pressure on the Supreme Leader.

The domestic and international pressures that would accompany a strategy of destabilization will undoubtedly test Khamenei's resolve. With Nasrallah already lost, he stands to lose even more, no matter which path he chooses.